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Abstract. This study sought to econometrically analyze the impact of corruption on bank profitability in 
Nigeria. Using a panel data set comprising 358 observations of 48 unique banks over the 1996 - 2006 time 
period, backward stepwise regression results reveal that corruption has a significant positive impact on bank 
profitability in Nigeria. The results lend credence to accusations that banks in Nigeria are thriving from 
corruption in the country. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The importance of bank profitability can be appraised at the micro and macro levels of the economy. 
At the micro level, profit is the essential prerequisite of a competitive banking institution and the 
cheapest source of funds. It is not merely a result, but also a necessity for successful banking in a 
period of growing competition on financial markets. Hence, the basic aim of a bank’s management is 
to achieve a profit, as the essential requirement for conducting any business (Bobáková, 2003: 21). At 
the macro level, a sound and profitable banking sector is better able to withstand negative shocks and 
contribute to the stability of the financial system. The importance of bank profitability at both the 
micro and macro levels has made researchers, academics, bank managements and bank regulatory 
authorities to develop considerable interest on the factors that determine bank profitability 
(Athanasoglou et al., 2005: 5). 
The broad aim of this paper is to analyze, on the basis of empirical evidence, the relationship between 
corruption and bank profitability in Nigeria. In the main, the paper has three motivations. First, though 
some researchers (e.g. McCartney, 2008) have asserted that corruption is bad for business, none of 
them has empirically analyzed the relationship between corruption and bank profitability. Considering 
the vital importance of the banking sector to an economy, it is imperative that we have an insight as to 
how this important issue affects them. Second, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), though currently 
concerned about enhancing the performance of banks operating in Nigeria, has never rendered an 
answer to the following question: To what extent does corruption influence the profitability of banks 
operating in Nigeria? Third, banks in Nigeria have severally been accused of thriving from, as well as 
being complicit in, the high rate of corruption in the country (Dike, 2004;Ribadu, 2006: 4-5; and Leba, 
2007: 17). An empirical study of the true nature of the relationship between corruption and bank 
profitability in Nigeria may help refute or reinforce these accusations. 
To achieve its broad aim, the remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. The next 
section builds up a theoretical framework for the study. Section 3 outlines the empirical estimation 
methods. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Conventional Corruption Theory 
Researchers have offered various definitions of corruption. McCartney (2008) defined corruption as 
the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. Dike (2004) defined it as the violation of established 
rules for personal gain and profit. However, all definitions of corruption point to the fact that it is 
always associated with some form of dishonesty for personal gain. 
Since the mid 1970s, corruption has infiltrated virtually every country in the world and become a 
global phenomenon (Frisch, 1996: 68). The problem cuts across all ethnic groups, faiths, religious 
denominations and political systems. It is found in democratic and dictatorial politics; feudal, capitalist 
and socialist economies. Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist cultures are equally bedeviled by 
corruption. This does not, however, mean that the magnitude of corruption is equal in every society. 
Some countries, ethnic groups, religious denominations, and political systems are more corrupt than 
others (Dike, 2004). 
There are five pre-conditions necessary for corruption to flourish under any economic, social or 
political order. First and foremost, it needs to be accepted by the highest level of government. A 
corrupt president is a guarantee of a corrupt government. Second, political office has to be widely 
perceived as the primary means of gaining access to wealth. Third, there has to exist a set of 
imperatives and incentives which encourage individuals to engage in corrupt transactions. These 
include widespread societal obsession with materialism, great inequality in distribution of wealth, 
glorification and approbation of ill-gotten wealth by the general public, widespread poverty, and low / 
irregular salaries for government officials with large dependent families (Frisch, 1996: 69). Fourth, 
corrupt individuals need to have access to and control over the means of corruption. These might 
include control over an administrative process such as tendering or having access to offshore accounts 
and the techniques of money laundering. Finally, there must be limited risks of exposure and 
punishment. This is the case when an ineffective taxing system is in place (making it difficult to track 
down people’s financial activities); acts of corruption go unreported (because virtually everyone is 
perceived to be corrupt in one way or the other), uninvestigated (due to weakened state structures), and 
/ or unpunished (due to powerlessness on the part of the judicial system as a result of corrupt judges or 
lack of appropriate legislation); and when there is widespread ignorance of the consequences of 
corruption. 
Many economists (e.g. Asiedu, 2003; and Dike, 2004) agree that corruption, when pervasive and 
deeply entrenched, has significant adverse effects on an economy. At the macroeconomic level, 
corruption is said to distort the composition of public expenditure by focusing spending on activities 
likely to yield large bribes, for example major public construction works and defence contracts. 
Corruption also discourages potential foreign direct investment (FDI) as a result of cost additions and 
uncertainty creation (Gastanaga et al., 1998; Ugwuodo, 2002; Asiedu, 2003; and Dike, 2004); 
discourages potential public donors; increases ineffective and unserviceable foreign debts (Frisch, 
1996: 68); and helps distort markets by redirecting economic activity from one sector to another, thus 
destroying the structure and pattern of economic development and reducing the efficiency of economic 
activity. Via fiscal, budgetary and debt effects, corruption negatively impacts the scale, form and 
growth rate of private sector development. Corruption also increases poverty. 
At the microeconomic level, widespread corruption culminates in low institutional quality and 
inefficient institutions (Asiedu, 2003). Corruption destroys companies by promoting bad management; 
significantly raising the costs of doing business (Frisch, 1996: 68); increasing the risk and 
uncertainties of doing business; discouraging and reducing investment in general and capital 
investment in particular (Dike, 2004); creating unfair competition by penalizing successful, yet honest, 
undertakings; encouraging production of substandard goods and services; diverting resources away 
from productive investment; complicating and delaying business transactions; and destroying long-
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term profitability and growth. Where businesses lose out on contracts because they have chosen not to 
engage in corrupt behaviour, there can be consequences not only for the profitability of the businesses 
concerned but, indirectly, for their shareholders, employees and lenders of finance. At the same time, a 
company that accedes to an act of corruption once is likely to be faced with further demands of a 
similar nature in the future (McCartney, 2008).Thus, the company has permanently subscribed to a 
commercial disadvantage.  
 
2.2 Corruption in Nigeria 
Since corruption is a global phenomenon, it is not peculiar to Nigeria. However, corruption is 
pandemic in Nigeria. It has been termed “Nigeria’s number one problem” (Ugwuodo, 2002). It is 
probably the main means to accumulate quick wealth in Nigeria. It occurs in many forms and has 
contributed immensely to the perpetual collapse of infrastructure and institutions, and to the poverty 
and misery of a large segment of the Nigerian population. The menace has led to slow movement of 
files in offices, late payment for services executed, police extortion tollgates and slow traffics on the 
highways, port congestion, business diversion to neighboring countries, queues at passport offices and 
gas stations, ghost workers syndrome, loss of tax revenue, relative economic underdevelopment, 
election irregularities, and even ritual murders for money-making (Dike, 2004). 
The history of corruption in Nigeria is strongly rooted in the over 29 years of military rule. Successive 
military regimes subdued the rule of law, facilitated the wanton looting of the public treasury, 
decapitated public institutions and free speech and instituted  
a secret and opaque culture in the running of government business (Ribadu, 2006: 1). Corruption 
thrived on this platform. It was therefore hoped that the return of Nigeria to democracy in May 1999 
would have gone some way to reducing corruption. Through increased openness resulting from 
governmental accountability and the freedom of the press, the process of democratization should, 
under normal circumstances, have mobilized efforts to overcome corruption (Frisch, 1996: 68). But, in 
2001, the corruption perception index (CPI), a corruption ranking (to one decimal place on a scale of 0 
– 10 with 0 being the most corrupt) published annually by Transparency International (a non 
governmental organization created in 1993), included 91 countries and showed Nigeria as the country 
where corruption was thought to be most prevalent in Africa. This ranking may not have been far from 
the truth since stolen public funds running into billions of US Dollars and Nigeria Naira have been 
discovered over the years. For instance Joshua Dariye, a Nigerian state governor, was found to have 
stolen millions of pounds fromNigerian funds meant to provide drinking water for the people of 
Plateau State (McCartney, 2008: 3). Indeed, many government officials, before being elected or 
appointed into offices, had little or modest income. But they are now owners of many properties 
around the world which they acquired through proceeds of corrupt practices.  
Most recently, Human Rights Watch (HRW), the global watchdog, castigated the administration of 
President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua for its massive failure in addressing the “endemic corruption” that 
has engulfed Nigeria. In a wide-ranging rebuke, HRW asserted that the President, despite his initial 
declaration of zero tolerance on corruption, has undermined the country's foremost anti-corruption 
body, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Also, whilst commending the 
President for publicly declaring his assets upon assumption of office, HRW noted with dismay that he 
has so far not managed to persuade other senior government officials to emulate him (Izeze, 2009). 
Dike (2004) and Ribadu (2006: 4-5) have given several reasons for the high rate of corruption in 
Nigeria. These include obsession with materialism, widespread poverty, great inequality in distribution 
of wealth, poor reward system, greed, glorification and approbation of ill-gotten wealth by the general 
public, perception of political office as the primary means of gaining access to wealth due to brazen 
display of wealth by public officials, complicity of bankers, ineffective taxing system, weakness of 
social and governmental enforcement mechanisms, absence of a strong sense of national community, 
and availability of safe havens for corrupt Nigerian officials to keep their loot abroad. 
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Banks in Nigeria, being microeconomic units, are not alienated from pervading corruption in the 
country. Leba (2007: 17) asserts, in very plain terms, that there is criminality in the Nigerian banking 
system. Reports are rife of banks in Nigeria wantonly violating stipulated regulations and guidelines. 
In 2002, twenty-one of them had their foreign exchange dealership licenses suspended due to 
irregularities in their transactions (NDIC, 2002: vii). In 2004, 54 banks contravened various CBN 
regulations and guidelines 99 times, as against 37 banks that contravened 66 times in 2003. Routine 
examinations of foreign exchange operations of these banks revealed various breaches. Anti-money 
laundering examinations revealed that they were splitting remittances to evade reporting transactions 
stipulated under Section 2 of the Money Laundering Act (CBN, 2004: 15-16). Also, speaking on 
financial crimes committed by banks operating in Nigeria’s foreign exchange market, a former 
governor of the CBN said: 
“It is an open secret that banks have been found to engage in sharp practices such as insider abuse, 
using customers’ names to procure foreign exchange without their consent, inappropriate and 
unauthorized use of foreign exchange, including outright round tripping of foreign exchange sourced 
from the AFEM [Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market]. Specifically, six banks were recently found 
to be involved… Except in the case of one bank, the staff [sic] of the banks identified were deeply 
involved… The offences committed included forged documentation with intent to roundtrip the 
amount involved (Sanusi, 2000: 4 and Ogowewo and Uche, 2006: 171-172).” 
Some members of the Nigerian public have a bad impression of some banks in Nigeria. Perennially, 
they have complained of manipulations, fraudulent practices and non-refund of wrong debits by the 
banks on their accounts (CBN, 2004: 17; CBN, 2005: 39; and CBN, 2006: 36). They also widely 
perceive that banks in Nigeria are veritable fences for looted public funds and profit therefrom (Leba, 
2007: 17). The Guardian Newspaper, in Page 6 of her Friday 28th December 2007 edition, carried a 
report titled ‘EFCC Fingers 10 Banks in Looting by Ex Governors’. Thereport stated that “not less 
than 10 banks have been linked with illegal transfer of public funds abroad by some former governors 
under investigation or trial by the EFCC … most of the huge funds being recovered by the EFCC from 
the former state executives were transferred out of the country through some officials of the banks”. 
Statistics produced by NDIC (2007: 100) indicate that bank supervisors and managerstop the category 
of bank staff involved in internal frauds and forgeries in banks in Nigeria. This evidence shows that 
there is high-level corruption and associated criminality in the Nigerian banking industry. 
Unfortunately, to my knowledge, no study has ever been conducted to econometrically examine the 
relationship between corruption and bank profitability in Nigeria. This is the gap in the existing body 
of literature sealed by this study. 
3 Empirical Estimation Methods 
 
3.1 The Framework 
To econometrically analyze the relationship between corruption and bank profitability in Nigeria, a 
multiple regression model (Eq. 1) was predicted. Regression estimates were derived using the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method (Kahane, 2001). Koutsoyiannis (2003: 100-116) statistically demonstrates 
that least squares estimates are the most reliable regression estimates because of their general quality 
of minimized bias and variance. To minimize suppressor effects (Field, 2005: 161), the backward 
stepwise regression method was used to analyze Eq. 1. 
The data set used for the purpose of this study comprised company-level indices of banks in Nigeria, 
Nigerian banking industry indices, Nigeria’s macroeconomic indices, and Nigeria’s CPI, over the 
1996 - 2006 period. While the CPIs were downloaded from Transparency International’s website, the 
company-level, industry-level, and macroeconomic indices were derived from the public financial 
statements of an unbalanced panel of 48 unique banks in 358 individual observations over the 1996 - 
2006 period, and various issues of CBN statistical bulletin, CBN annual report and statement of 
accounts, CBN monetary policy circulars, Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) annual 
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report and statement of accounts, Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) annual report and 
accounts, and The Little Data Book of the World Bank, over the same period. During the data 
screening process, extreme outliers were detected by means of box and whiskers plots and excluded 
from the data set. 
 
3.2 The Predicted Model 
Pi,t = αo + δ1∑Ci,t + δ2∑It + δ3∑Mt + δ4CORRUPTIONt + εi,t   (1) 
where i = bank 1,…, bank 48; t = 1996,…,2006; Pi,t is predicted profits of bank i at time t; ∑Ci,t 
represents a cluster of company-level explanatory variables of bank i at time t; ∑It represents a cluster 
of industry-level explanatory variables at time t; ∑Mt represents a cluster of macroeconomic 
explanatory variables at time t; CORRUPTIONt is level of corruption at time t; αo is the regression 
intercept; δ1…4 represent variable coefficients; while εi,t is an error term. 
In this model, the focal point of interest was on the coefficient of corruption. ∑Ci,t,∑It, and ∑Mt were 
infused into the model as control variables. Table 1 (see Appendix) is a compressed exposition of the 
predicted model’s variables.  
 
3.3  
VARIABLE DEFINITION(S) SOURCE 
R
eg
re
ss
an
d
 Pi,t Ratio of before tax profits to total assets (BTP/TA) (1) 
Ratio of after tax profits to total assets (ROA) (2) 
Following Athanasoglou et al. (2005: 13), for the calculation of each 
regressand, I use the average value of assets of two consecutive years and 
not the end-year values, since profits are a flow variable generated during 
the year. 
Athanasoglou et 
al. (2005) 
Jiménez et al. 
(2007: 14) 
D
e
te
rm
in
an
ts
 
∑Ci,t 
Company-level variables that could influence the profitability of bank i at time t 
Aburime (2008a) 
and Aburime 
(2009b) 
∑It 
Industry-level variables that could influence the profitability of bank i at time t 
Aburime 
(2008b) 
∑Mt 
 
Macroeconomic variables that could influence the profitability of bank i at time t 
Aburime 
(2009a) 
CORRUPTIONt  Transparency International’s CPI for Nigeria at time t  
 
 
4 The Results 
 
The final regression results via the backward stepwise regression method are contained in Table 2 (see 
Appendix). The standard errors of the regression coefficients are highlighted in brackets. Individually, 
the models explain about 75.1% and 75% of the variation in BTP / TA and ROA, respectively, of 
banks in Nigeria over the 1996 - 2006 period. Therefore, on the average, the empirical estimations 
explain about 75% of bank profits variation in Nigeria over the period. Significant F statistics indicate 
statistical significance of the estimations. 
In the main, four reliable inferences can be drawn from the results. First and foremost, the coefficients 
of corruption in the models are significantly negative, implying that as CPI increases (indicating 
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reduction in corruption), bank profitability in Nigeria significantly decreases. Conversely, as CPI 
reduces (indicating increase in corruption), bank profitability in Nigeria significantly increases. The 
significance of the corruption coefficients indicates that banks in Nigeria are significantly thriving 
from, and may also be complicit in (being benefactors), the high rate of corruption in the country. 
The second inference to be drawn from the results is that capital size is a significant negative 
determinant of bank profitability in Nigeria. In a previous study (Aburime, 2008a), Idiscovered that 
capital size had a negative relationship with bank profitability in Nigeria. But, in that study, the 
relationship was insignificant. I opine that the inconsistency is dueto the controlling of suppressor 
effects in the more recent estimations. However, in both studies, the negative regression coefficients 
reinforce my assertion of reduced profitability whenever there is an increase in bank minimum share 
capital requirements in Nigeria. 
The third inference is that the composition of credit portfolios significantly influences bank 
profitability in Nigeria. When credit portfolios are performing, banks’ profits are improved and vice 
versa. This finding is consistent with the one in my previous paper (Aburime, 2009b). Hence, to 
maximize profitability, banks in Nigeria need to take vibrant steps to minimize occurrence of bad and 
doubtful debts. Effective credit evaluation and monitoring, at all times, is recommended. 
The fourth inference is that risk is a significant negative determinant of bank profitability in Nigeria. 
This finding is consistent with those of Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), 
Bobáková (2003: 21) and Athanasoglou et al. (2005: 14, 25).  The profitability of banks in Nigeria 
partly depends on their ability to foresee, avoid and monitor risks. Hence, in making decisions on the 
allocation of resources to asset deals, banks in Nigeria need to always consider the level of risk to their 
assets. 
Table 2- Final Regression Results 
VARIABLES BTP/TA AS REGRESSAND β ROA AS REGRESSAND β 
αo .357 (.061)*** - .352 (.061)*** - 
∑Ci,t 
CAPi,t-1  (SC to TA) -.322 (.103)** -.193 -.333 (.103)** -.202 
CCPi,t (PL to TL) .110 (.037)** .206 .106 (.037)** .200 
Ri,t -.354 (.045)*** -.618 -.351 (.045)*** -.619 
Oi,t (FB/DB) -.039 (.021) -.124 -.037 (.020) -.121 
CORRUPTIONt -.057 (.025)* -.135 -.057 (.025)* -.136 
R
2
 / Adj R
2
 .751 / .734 - .750 / .734 - 
Durbin-Watson 2.165 - 2.162 - 
ANOVA (F) 44.658*** - 44.490*** - 
Note * p < .05, ** p < .01,  and *** p < .001 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have specified an empirical framework to investigate the impact of corruption on bank 
profitability. Based on the results of the empirical analysis, banks in Nigeria are significantly thriving 
from, and may also be complicit in, the high rate of corruption in the country. Therefore, the EFCC 
and other organizations saddled with the task of eradicating corruption in Nigeria should earnestly 
beam their searchlights on banks in Nigeria, being possible conduit pipes for corrupt financial flows. 
Bank officials should be compelled to always act in accordance with existing laws and maintain high 
technical and ethical standards. Managements of banks in Nigeria should be made to look inward and 
rid their rank and file of thieves and other dubious persons possessing criminal instincts (Ketefe, 2006: 
11). Banks should be enjoined to take, and continue to take, a closer look at their own operations, 
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declining to provide tolerant environments for corrupt financial flows. Bankers who come across 
corrupt financial transactions during the course of their work must not be party to it. Rather, they 
should report these transactions to the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Commission, the EFCC, the Code of Conduct Bureau, and other organizations saddled with the task of 
eradicating corruption in Nigeria, in addition to the CBN. Failure to do so should be met with dire 
consequences; and CBN sanctions for indicted errant banks should extend beyond the status quo of 
merely slapping their wrists (Leba, 2007: 17). The Senate Committee on Banking, Insurance and 
Financial Institutions and the House Committee on Banking and Currency should contribute their 
quota towards ensuring that banks in Nigeria are no longer linked to acts of corruption. Even though 
these anti-corruption measures would lead to a decline in the profitability of banks in Nigeria, they 
would engender professionalism and market discipline, encourage potential FDI, encourage potential 
public donors, positively impact the scale, form and growth rate of private sector development, and 
enhance the efficiency of economic activity (Gastanaga et al., 1998; Ugwuodo, 2002; Asiedu, 2003; 
and Dike, 2004). Undoubtedly, the entire Nigerian society would end up much better.  
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